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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROME STATUTE
IMPLEMENTATION IN AFGHANISTAN
Abdul Mahir Hazim*
Abstract
Afghanistan has been a war-torn country for the past forty years. Over
this time, countless atrocities have been committed and the lives of
thousands of innocents have been taken. For example, according to the
most recent report by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA), in 2018 alone 10,993 civilians were killed or injured in the
country, one of the highest number of causalities since UNAMA started
recording such numbers in 2007. Yet no one has been held accountable
for the atrocities, neither in national nor in international courts, and an
entrenched culture of impunity continues to flourish to the present day.
This lack of accountability is particularly vexing given that Afghanistan
has been a state party to the Rome Statute since 2003, and the
International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdictions over crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide committed within the country after
May 1, 2003.
The purpose of this Article is to critically examine the situation in
Afghanistan after 2003 with regard to international crimes and
preliminary ICC investigations, with a close eye on the latest efforts of
the ICC and the government of Afghanistan. This Article argues that
Afghanistan has not yet fulfilled its basic obligations under the Rome
Statute to prosecute grave crimes and cooperate with the ICC; and the
ICC has not duly accomplished its mandate in the country by exercising
its jurisdiction and prosecuting pertinent crimes. Furthermore, this
Article will deconstruct the recent Afghan government’s argument
against the applicability of the complementarity principle of the Rome
Statute, and instead contend that the two-pronged test of unwillingness
and inability on the part of the Afghan government has been met and thus
ICC intervention is not only legally justified but mandated. Furthermore,
this Article problematizes the recent decision and reasoning of the PreTrial Chamber to not allow the Prosecutor to proceed with an actual
investigation in Afghanistan. Finally, the Article explores potential
impacts of an ICC intervention and benefits of opening an actual
investigation in the country.

* I am very grateful for my long-time mentor, Gayle Zilber, who closely reviewed and
edited the first draft of this Article and provided very insightful comments. Her edits and
suggestions made the argument and the organization of this Article much clearer and stronger
than it was before. In addition, I’d like to recognize and appreciate the editorial team of the
Florida Journal of International Law for their edits and reviews.
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INTRODUCTION
Afghanistan has been suffering from war and conflict for the last four
decades. While countless international crimes have been committed in the
country, not a single individual has yet been brought to justice. After the
establishment of a new government in 2001, Afghanistan acceded to the Rome
Statute, giving the ICC jurisdiction over any crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide committed within the country after May 1, 2003.
Although, regrettably, massive atrocities have continued to take place in the
country after 2003, neither the government of Afghanistan nor the ICC has taken
any effective and meaningful action to address the crimes and hold the
perpetrators accountable.
The purpose of this Article is to critically analyze the Rome Statute
implementation in Afghanistan after 2003, with a close eye on the ICC and
Afghanistan’s recent actions to address international crimes. This Article argues
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that Afghanistan has not yet fulfilled its basic obligations under the Rome
Statute to prosecute grave crimes and cooperate with the ICC; and the ICC has
not duly accomplished its mandate in the country by exercising its jurisdiction
to investigate and prosecute pertinent crimes. Furthermore, this Article
problematizes the recent decision and reasoning of the Pre-Trial Chamber to not
allow the Prosecutor to proceed with an actual investigation in Afghanistan.
Finally, the Article explores potential impacts of an ICC intervention and
benefits of opening an actual investigation in the country.
This Article is comprised of eight parts including this introduction. Part I
gives a brief background on international crimes that occurred after 2003 with
some specific data on civilian casualties resulting from those crimes. Part II
identifies Afghanistan’s major obligations under the Rome Statute and examines
the extent to which the country has fulfilled its obligations. Part III examines
the ICC mandate under the Rome Statute and explores whether the Court has
taken meaningful steps towards accomplishing its mandate. Part IV discusses
the principle of complementarity and critiques the government of Afghanistan’s
claims regarding its application. Part V problematizes the recent Pre-Trial
Chamber decision and reasoning for not authorizing the Prosecutor to proceed
with a formal investigation. Part VI identifies some potential impacts if a full
investigation were conducted by the Prosecutor. Finally, the last part is devoted
to the conclusion.

I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE ICC IN AFGHANISTAN: A BRIEF
BACKGROUND
For four decades, Afghanistan has been plagued by endless war and conflict.
Over this long period, horrific atrocities have been committed by various state
and non-state actors. Before the establishment of a new government in 2001,
diverse reports asserted that most all parties to the conflict had committed war
crimes and crimes against humanity, including the People’s Democratic Party
of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union troops (1979–1992),1 various Mujahideen
factions during the civil war (1992–1996),2 and the Taliban (1996–2001).3
During each conflict, it is estimated that thousands of civilians were summarily
executed, killed, or disappeared, and millions of people have been displaced or
forced to flee their home country and take refuge in neighboring countries and
around the globe.4 Unfortunately, no one has been held accountable for the

1. See Ashley Jackson, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-–2009,
OXFAM INT’L 7–9 (Nov. 2009), https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/
afghanistan-the-cost-of-war_14.pdf [hereinafter OXFAM REPORT].
2. See id. at 9–10.
3. See id. at 11–12.
4. See id. at 7–12.
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commission of such heinous crimes and violations of human rights and
humanitarian law.5
After the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and the establishment of a new
government, Afghanistan acceded to the Rome Statute on February 10, 2003,6
becoming a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(the Rome Statute).7 As such, the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over three
categories of crimes: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide8 that
occurred or may occur within the territory of Afghanistan or crimes that were
committed or may be committed by Afghan nationals after May 1, 2003.9 Any
atrocities committed before that date do not fall under ICC jurisdiction.10
According to the UN and other organization reports, thousands of civilians
have been killed or injured since May 1, 2003, the causative crimes potentially
subject to ICC jurisdiction. In 2007, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) started recording and publishing quarterly and annual reports on the
situation of civilians in armed conflict, particularly civilian casualties in
Afghanistan.11 In the past eleven years, the number of civilian casualties
recorded were as follows: 1,523 (2007),12 2,118 (2008),13 2,412 (2009),14 2,777

5. See, e.g., id; Patricia Grossman, Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity: 19782001, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION 4-131 (July 2005), https://www.opensociety
foundations.org/publications/casting-shadows-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-19782001 [hereinafter THE AJP REPORT]; Emily Winterbotham, The State of Transitional Justice in
Afghanistan Actors, Approaches and Challenges, AFG. RESEARCH EVALUATION UNIT 4 (Apr.
2010), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bc6ccb42.pdf; Abdul Mahir Hazim, Toward Cooperation
between Afghanistan and the International Criminal Court, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 615,
615–24, 642, 666 (2017).
6. Preliminary Examination: Afghanistan, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/
afghanistan (last visited Aug. 15, 2019) [hereinafter THE ICC WEBSITE].
7. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statu
te.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5 (1) & 11, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter The Rome Statute].
9. Id.
10. See generally The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%
20statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
11. Reports on the Protections of Civilians in Armed Conflict, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION
IN AFG., https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
12. Civilian Casualties during 2007, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (2007),
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/poc-civilian-casualties-report-2007.pdf.
13. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2008, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 7 (Jan. 2009), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
unama_09february-annual20report_poc202008_final_11feb09.pdf.
14. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Jan. 2010), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
protection_of_civilian_2009_report_english_1.pdf.
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(2010),15 3,021 (2011),16 7,559 (2012),17 8,615 (2013),18 10,548 (2014),1911,002
(2015),20 11,418 (2016),21 10,453 (2017),22 10,993 (2018),23 and 3,812 (mid
2019).24 These numbers show a steady increase in civilian casualties until 2016
when it reached a peak, followed by a very slow and somewhat fluctuating
decline toward the middle of 2019.25
Below is a detailed chart of casualties provided by UNAMA for the last ten
years.

15. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. i (Mar. 2011), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
engi_version_of_poc_annual_report_2011.pdf.
16. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2011, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Feb. 2012), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
unama_poc_report_final_feb_2012.pdf.
17. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2012, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Feb. 2013), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
2012_annual_report_eng_0.pdf.
18. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2013, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Feb. 2014), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
feb_8_2014_poc-report_2013-full-report-eng.pdf.
19. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2014, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Feb. 2015), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
2014-annual-report-on-protection-of-civilians-final.pdf.
20. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2015, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Feb. 2016), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
poc_annual_report_2015_final_14_feb_2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 ANNUAL REPORT].
21. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2016, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Feb. 2017), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_annual_report_2016_final280317.pdf.
22. Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report, 2017, U.N.
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_
protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2017_final_6_march.pdf.
23. Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report,
2018, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 1 (Feb. 2019), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/
default/files/unama_annual_protection_of_civilians_report_2018_-_23_feb_2019_-_english.pdf
[hereinafter 2018 ANNUAL REPORT].
24. Midyear Update on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 June
2019, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG., 1 (July 30, 2019), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/
default/files/unama_poc_midyear_update_2019_-_30_july_2019_english.pdf.
25. See, e.g., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 1; 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
23, at 1.
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The 2019 midyear report demonstrated a 27% decrease in civilian casualties
compared to the same period of 2018.26 However, as the security situation has
worsened and Taliban attacks have intensified recently, it is highly likely that
casualties will increase dramatically during the second half of 2019. A recent
BBC report found that the number of war casualties in Afghanistan exceeded
the combined number of casualties in Syria and Yemen over the month of
August 2019.27 The BBC indicated that at least 74 people were killed daily in
Afghanistan in August.28
UNAMA also provided data on the causes of casualties which could help
determine the presence and nature of potential war crimes committed by various
parties to the conflict. According to its 2018 annual report, combined
improvised explosive devices and ground engagements were the primary
factors, causing 73% of civilian casualties in the country that year.29
This is a detailed diagram on the causes of civilian casualties in 2018
provided by UNAMA.

26. Id.
27. Talafat Jang Afghanistan Dar Muqayesa Ba Dargirihai Syria Wa Yemen [War
Casualties in Afghanistan Compared with Syria and Yemen Wars], BBC PERSIAN,
https://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan-49720076 (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
28. Id.
29. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 2.
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UNAMA attributes civilian casualties to two categories of actors: antigovernment elements and pro-government forces.30 For instance, in 2018, antigovernment elements were responsible for 63% of civilian casualties.31 Below
is another diagram provided by UNAMA on parties to the conflict.

30. See, e.g., id. 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 4.
31. Id.
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Furthermore, in a separate series of publications, UNAMA has provided
biennial reports on the treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghanistan
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since 2011.32 All the biennial reports (2011,33 2013,34 2015,35 2017,36 & 201937)
found “credible and reliable”38 information that detainees have “experienced
torture and other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment whilst in custody.”39
According to the reports, such torture and degrading treatment has been
perpetrated by the National Directorate of Security, the Afghan National Police,
the Afghan National Army, and the Afghan Local Police.40 The reports also
assert that some of the detainees experienced “systematic use of torture” and
“interrogation techniques that met the international definition of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.”41
After the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC made public its
preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan in 2007,42 it has
provided annual reporting on the progress of the preliminary examination in
Afghanistan. In its 2016 report, the OTP concluded that two categories of
crimes—crimes against humanity and war crimes—have been allegedly
committed by the Taliban and the Haqqani Network,43 Afghan government

32. See Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, U.N. ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN AFG., https://unama.unmissions.org/treatment-conflict-related-detainees-afghancustody (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
33. See Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, U.N. ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN AFG. 2–11 (Oct. 2011), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/october10
_2011_unama_detention_full-report_eng.pdf.
34. See Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody, U.N. ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN AFG. 28–61 (Jan. 2013), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/master
_unama_detention_report_20_jan_2013_final.pdf.
35. See Update on the Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody:
Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN
AFG. 15–68 (Feb. 2015), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_detention
_report_2015_revised.pdf [hereinafter Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees 2015].
36. See Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees: Implementation of Afghanistan’s
National Plan on the Elimination of Torture, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 20–38 (Apr.
2017), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/treatment_of_conflict-related_detainees_
24_april_2017.pdf.
37. See Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghanistan: Preventing Torture and
Ill-treatment under the Anti-Torture Law, U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. 12 (Apr. 2019),
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_-_report_on_the_treatment_of_
conflict-related_detainees_-_17_april_2019.pdf.
38. See, e.g., id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., id.
41. See, e.g., Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees 2015, supra note 35, at vi.
42. THE ICC WEBSITE, supra note 6.
43. “The Haqqani Network (HN) is an insurgent group that operates in the Southeastern
region of Afghanistan and the Northwestern of Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.”
STAN. UNIV., http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2019).
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forces, and US military forces.44 Some of the crimes against humanity that were
identified included “murder,” “imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty,”45 and “persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political grounds and on gender grounds.”46 Some of the alleged
war crimes encompassed willful killing, torture and inhuman treatment, sexual
violence, rape, intentionally attacking civilians, intentionally attacking
protected objects, and using children in hostilities.47

II. AFGHANISTAN’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ROME STATUTE: THE
EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED
To determine the extent to which the government of Afghanistan has
fulfilled its obligations under the Rome Statute, two items must be examined.
First, which specific obligations Afghanistan has under the Rome Statute;
second, whether Afghanistan has complied with those enumerated obligations.

A. Afghanistan’s Major Obligations Under the Rome Statute
As a state party to the Rome Statute, Afghanistan bears at least three major
interconnected obligations, specifically, an obligation to prosecute international
crimes, to cooperate fully with the ICC, and to implement legislation to bring
its national law in conformity with Rome Statute standards. All these obligations
are grounded in the Rome Statute.
First, Afghanistan has an obligation to investigate and prosecute the three
categories of international crimes.48 The Rome Statute has vested the primary
responsibility for investigating and prosecuting such crimes in the national
courts of State Parties.49 As a Party to the Rome Statute, it is the responsibility
of Afghanistan to prosecute those international crimes that occur within its
territory or are committed by its nationals.
The second obligation of Afghanistan is to fully cooperate with the ICC.
Article 86 of the Statute provides that, “States Parties shall, in accordance with
the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation
and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”50 Part IX of the
Rome Statute is devoted to international cooperation and judicial assistance and
provides details on how State Parties fulfill their cooperation obligation. For
44. Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, INT’L CRIM. CT. para. 198 (Nov.
14, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf [hereinafter OTP
Report 2016].
45. See id. at para. 206.
46. See id.
47. See id. at para. 207 & 209.
48. See The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17. See also Implementing Legislation on
the Rome Statute, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR GLOB. ACTION, http://www.pgaction.org/campaigns/
icc/implementing-legislation.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
49. Implementing Legislation on the Rome Statute, supra note 48.
50. The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 86.
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instance, State Parties should comply with the ICC’s requests for cooperation
on the arrest and surrender of suspects, collecting evidence and documents
during investigation and prosecution, and enforcement of sentences, forfeitures,
and fines.51
Finally, the third major obligation of Afghanistan is to implement legislation
and adjust its domestic law to accord with the standards of the Rome Statute.
This adjustment includes both substantive and procedural laws. Adjustment in
substantive law means incorporating the definition of three categories of
international crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide) into
domestic legislation.52 Although the Rome Statute does not explicitly require
State Parties to implement new legislation with regard to substantive laws, it has
been argued that without recognizing these international crimes within national
law, it would be difficult even for a “monist” state to fulfill its primary
obligation of prosecuting the crimes.53
There are two well-known approaches to international law: monist and
dualist approaches.54 In the monist approach, there is no difference between
international law and domestic law and thus a State will directly apply
international law in its domestic courts.55 However, in the dualist approach,
domestic courts will not directly apply international law unless the relevant
international law is incorporated into domestic law.56 Although it is not perfectly
clear what approach Afghanistan is following in applying international law,57
the country practice suggests that it is more of a dualist state than a monist. For
example, instead of directly applying the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Afghanistan has enacted a specific
law58 on the elimination of violence against women in order to comply with its
obligations under that convention. As a presumptive dualist state, Afghanistan
has an obligation under the Rome Statute to modify its national law and
incorporate the core international crimes into its domestic legislation.
The Rome Statute, however, is very clear about the requirement to ensure
procedural legislation. Article 88 of the Statute explicitly states that, “States
Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law

51. See id. at art. 89–93, 103, 104. See also Hazim, supra note 5, at 631–35.
52. See Implementing Legislation on the Rome Statute, supra note 48.
53. Id.
54. How Does International Law Apply in a Domestic Legal System, THE PEACE AND
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, https://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/dualistand-monist (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Morgan Galland et al., An Introduction to International Law for Afghanistan, AFG.
LEGAL EDUC. PROJECT 47, https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Introto-International-Law-for-Afg.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
58. QANOONI MANE KHOSHONAT ALAIHE ZANAN [LAW ON ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN], Official Gazette, August 2009, No. 989.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

12

[Vol. 31

for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.”59
Accordingly, Afghanistan has an obligation to make procedures available in its
domestic law, define the relationship between the ICC and its national courts,
and identify the responsibilities of its domestic authorities in implementing ICC
requests.60

B. Has Afghanistan Fulfilled Its Basic Obligations?
Having detailed Afghanistan’s three major obligations under the Rome
Statute, this Article now examines whether Afghanistan has fulfilled those
obligations. Regarding the first obligation to prosecute the three international
crimes, there is no evidence that Afghanistan has taken genuine and substantial
steps towards fulfillment of this obligation over the past fifteen years.61
According to an OTP report in 2016, only two high-ranking members of the
Haqqani Network were ever tried in a Kabul Primary Court in 2016.62 Although
the government of Afghanistan has not yet provided specific information about
the trial of those individuals to the OTP,63 given the absence of the new Penal
Code at that time, it can be surmised that the two were either prosecuted and
tried under the old Penal Code or under the Law on Crimes against Internal and
External Security.64 Despite the apparent trial of the two members of the
Haqqani Network, in her request to the Pre-Trial Chamber II, the ICC prosecutor
admitted that Afghanistan has not conducted any domestic investigations or
prosecutions of those individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for the
relevant international crimes.65
Along these lines, the Attorney General’s Office in Afghanistan established
a new department called the International Crimes Department last year.
However, according to one official in the department, no international crimes
have been prosecuted by the department yet.66 While the establishment of the
department could be a positive step, it cannot be considered part of the
fulfillment of the prosecution obligation unless it actually starts to prosecute
such crimes. Based on the author’s conversation with the official, prosecution
of international crimes by the department seems remote, at least in the near
future.

59. The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 88.
60. See Hazim, supra note 5, at 653–62.
61. See OTP Report 2016, supra note 44, at para. 215.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Request for
Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to article 15 para. 270 (Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter The
OTP Request].
65. See id. at para. 269.
66. The author conducted an interview with a responsible person (who did not give
permission to disclose his name or position) of the International Crime Department last summer
in Kabul.
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With regard to the second obligation, Afghanistan has been in a state of noncooperation with the ICC since 2008,67 the time the ICC started to examine the
situation in Afghanistan. As the OTP’s reports and the ICC’s reports to the
United Nations’ General Assembly indicate, the government of Afghanistan has
consistently failed to respond to ICC requests and has not provided the required
information needed for the ICC’s preliminary examination.68 For instance, the
OTP report in 2016 expressed that “[t]he Government [of Afghanistan] has not
provided any information on national proceedings to the Office, despite multiple
requests for such information from the Office since 2008, including two requests
submitted during the reporting period.”69 All the reports show that Afghanistan
has not complied with its obligation to fully cooperate with the ICC.
Over the past fourteen years, Afghanistan has done little to fulfill its third
major obligation. The country has only recently incorporated a handful of
substantive matters and general principles from the Rome Statute into national
law, such as the four categories of international crimes which were inserted in
the country’s new Penal Code.70 The new Penal Code was adopted and
published by the government of Afghanistan in the Official Gazette in 2017 and
entered into force in February of 2018.71 As stated above, there is no indication
that the relevant provisions of the code are currently being implemented.
Furthermore, the government of Afghanistan has not yet adjusted its domestic
procedures to comply with the requirements of the Rome Statute.72 It has been
posited that one of the main reasons Afghanistan has not been able to fully
cooperate with the ICC is the lack of appropriate domestic procedures.73
Without the necessary coordination mechanisms, Afghanistan will continue to
fail to provide coherent responses to ICC requests.74
Not only has Afghanistan not fulfilled its obligations, but it also occasionally
has attempted to stop the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction. According to
some reports, the government of Afghanistan has requested the ICC to delay its
investigation for one more year.75 The government of Afghanistan has suggested

67. See, e.g., OTP Report 2016, supra note 44, at para. 215; Report on Preliminary
Examination Activities (2015), INT’L CRIM. CT. para. 126 (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf; Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
2012, INT’L CRIM. CT. para. 37 (Nov. 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C4627C4E-4358-8A72-8D99FD00E8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22
Nov2012.pdf; Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2008/09, INT’L
CRIM. CT. para. 46 (Sept. 17, 2009), http://iccnow.org/documents/A_64_356_ENG2.pdf.
68. OTP Report 2016, supra note 44, at para. 217.
69. Id.
70. QANOONE JAZA [PENAL CODE], art. 332–43, Official Gazette, May 2017, No. 1260.
71. See id. at art. 17, 916.
72. See Hazim, supra note 5, at 639.
73. See id.
74. Hazim, supra note 5, at 639.
75. Ehsan Qaane, Investigating Post-2003 War Crimes: Afghan Government Wants “One
More Year” from the ICC, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK (June 27, 2017), https://www.afghanistan-
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that ICC intervention may disrupt the peace deal with the warlord Hekmatyar
who joined the Afghan peace process in 2016.76

III. THE ICC MANDATE: HAS THE ICC DONE ENOUGH TOWARD
ACCOMPLISHING ITS MANDATE IN AFGHANISTAN?
This Article next describes the mandate of the ICC under the Rome Statute
and delineates the extent of ICC efforts to accomplish its mandate in
Afghanistan.

A. The ICC Mandate
The ICC core mandate is very clear and simple in the Rome Statute—to
ensure effective prosecution of “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community”77 “by taking measures at the national level and by
enhancing international cooperation.”78 In addition, the ICC Mandate is to create
deterrence by ending the culture of impunity for perpetrators of the most heinous
crimes: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.79 Accomplishing
the ICC mandate should help “the fight against impunity and the establishment
of the rule of law by ensuring that the most serious crimes do not go unpunished
and by promoting respect for international law.”80 Therefore, the main mandate
of the ICC is punishing perpetrators of international crimes and, in so doing,
deterring future such crimes.

B. Has the ICC Accomplished Its Mandate in Afghanistan?
An examination of all the ICC’s actions with regard to the situation in
Afghanistan shows that the ICC has done very little toward carrying out its
mandate in Afghanistan. Nor has the ICC had any effect on the situation in
Afghanistan thus far. The ICC’s hesitance to address the situation in
Afghanistan is clearly demonstrated by the fact it took approximately 14 years
for the OTP to finally seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber II to start
an investigation in Afghanistan in 2017. As further evidence of the ICC’s
reluctance to fulfill its mandate in Afghanistan, the chamber rejected the OTP
request on April 12, 2019. As explained above, various parties to the conflict
have continued to commit crimes that amount to international crimes under the
Rome Statute.81 This indicates that the core mandate of the ICC, which is to
analysts.org/investigating-post-2003-war-crimes-afghan-government-wants-one-more-yearfrom-the-icc/.
76. Id.
77. The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at pmbl. para. (4).
78. Id.
79. The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at pmbl. para. (5) & art. (5).
80. Sang-Hyun Song, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Ending Impunity and
Establishing the Rule of Law, U.N. CHRONICLE (Dec. 2012), https://unchronicle.un.org/article/
role-international-criminal-court-ending-impunity-and-establishing-rule-law.
81. See Hazim, supra note 48.
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prosecute the most heinous international crimes and deter future such crimes,
remains merely words. Below, this article briefly examines all the actions that
the ICC has taken with respect to Afghanistan.
The ICC initiated a preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan
in 2006 based on Article 13 (c)82 and made it public in 2017.83 Based on the ICC
reports to the UN General Assembly, it appears Afghanistan has the privilege
of being under preliminary examination longer than any other country (nine
years).84 As the ICC reports indicate, for three years (2009–2011) the ICC
primarily monitored the situation in Afghanistan from the outside without taking
serious steps to effectively engage with the situation.85 During the next six years
(2012–2017), the ICC gathered and verified information and assessed the
admissibility of evidence on the alleged crimes.86 The ICC has reported on the
non-cooperation of the government of Afghanistan in nearly all its reports, yet
it never took action to address the problem.87 In accordance with the Rome
Statute, the ICC could at least have referred the issue of Afghanistan’s noncooperation to the Assembly of State Parties. According to Article 87 (7) of the
Rome Statute, if a State Party fails to cooperate with the ICC, the court may
refer the case to the Assembly of State Parties to address the problem.88
Finally, on November 2017, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou
Bensouda, announced that she had requested, “the Court’s Judges to initiate an
82. The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 13 (c).
83. Statement, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
Requests Judicial Authorization to Commence an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/
item.aspx?name=171120-otp-stat-afgh [hereinafter The Prosecutor Announcement].
84. See Hazim, supra note 5, at 641.
85. See, e.g., Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2008/09,
INT’L CRIM. CT. 13 (2009), http://iccnow.org/documents/A_64_356_ENG2.pdf; Report of the
International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2009/10, INT’L CRIM. CT. 16 (2010),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA7DF985-4549-40EF-A0DC-814BE440655C/282599/
ICC6RepEng.pdf; Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2010/11,
INT’L CRIM. CT. 15 (2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D207D618-D99D-49B6A1FC-A1A221B43007/283906/ICC2011AnnualReporttoUNEnglish1.pdf.
86. See Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2011/12, INT’L
CRIM. CT. 15 (2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/A67308EN.pdf; Report of the
International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2012/13, INT’L CRIM. CT. 14 (2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/N1342653.pdf; Report of the International Criminal Court
to the United Nations for 2013/14, INT’L CRIM. CT. 5 (2014), https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/presidency/ICC-Rep-UNGA-30-10-2014-Eng.pdf; Report of the International
Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2014/15, INT’L CRIM. CT. 4 (2015), https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/other/UNGA_2015-Eng.pdf; Report of the International Criminal Court to the
United Nations for 2015/16, INT’L CRIM. CT. 4 (2016), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view
_doc.asp?symbol=a/71/342&referer=http://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts&Lang=E; Report
of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2016/17, INT’L CRIM. CT. 4 (2017),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/A72349/170817-rep-UNSC_ENG.pdf.
87. See, e.g., id.
88. See The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 87 (7).
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investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed
in the context of the ongoing armed conflict in the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan.”89 This was viewed as a major development and serious step
towards initiating an actual investigation. In her request, the prosecutor listed
the following categories of crimes that have occurred in Afghanistan: (1) crimes
against humanity and war crimes by the Taliban and the Haqqani Network; (2)
war crimes by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); and (3) war crimes
by members of the United States armed forces and members of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), mostly between 2003–2004.90
After almost one and a half years, the Pre-Trial Chamber II delivered its
decision and, unfortunately, denied the Prosecutor’s request to initiate a full
investigation.91 While the Chamber recognized that the court’s jurisdiction and
admissibility requirements were satisfied,92 it asserted that there were
considerable “reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests of justice.”93 Fortunately, after the OTP appealed the case, on March 5,
2020, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC amended the decision of the Pre-Trial
Chamber and authorized the Prosecutor to initiate an actual investigation.94 This
is the most significant and notable decision of the ICC with respect to the
situation in Afghanistan so far. While the authorization of an investigation is a
great step forward, the ICC is far away from fulfilling its mandate. Only an
effective investigation and prosecution and holding the perpetrators of the
crimes accountable could be a requisite for accomplishment of the mandate.

IV. COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE: AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
The Afghan government had not taken a public stand concerning the ICC
preliminary examination over the prior years. However, when the ICC Chief
Prosecutor announced that she had requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber grant
authorization to initiate an investigation, the government of Afghanistan made
known its position through its permanent representative at the United Nations
in 2017.95 It appears that the government of Afghanistan means to argue that it
is both willing and able to prosecute any international crimes purportedly
89. The Prosecutor Announcement, supra note 83.
90. Id.
91. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation, ¶ 96 (Apr.
12, 2019) [hereinafter The Chamber Decision].
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Afghanistan: ICC Appeals Chamber Authorises the Opening of An Investigation,
INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1516.
95. Afghan Mission, Statement at the 16th Session of Assembly of States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the ICC, PERMANENT MISSION OF AFG. TO THE U.N. IN N.Y. (Dec. 7, 2017),
http://afghanistan-un.org/2017/12/statement-at-the-16th-session-of-assembly-of-states-parties-to
-the-rome-statute-of-the-icc/.
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committed in the country.96 This argument raises the question of the principle
of complementarity and whether the ICC has jurisdiction over international
crimes committed in Afghanistan. Although the OTP and the Pre-Trial Chamber
II have already concluded that the threshold for application of the principle of
complementarity has been met, it is worth briefly discussing the principle and
analyzing whether the government of Afghanistan’s argument holds.
ICC jurisdiction is complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction of
State Parties.97 The court was established to complement national courts,98 and
the Rome Statute gives priority to the national jurisdictions to investigate and
prosecute the three categories of international crimes.99 Although the word
“complementarity” does not exist in the Rome Statute,100 the idea of resolving
conflicts of jurisdiction between the ICC and national courts over crimes is
widely recognized among scholars and commentators as the principle of
complementarity.101 According to the Rome Statute, national courts have the
primary duty to bring perpetrators of serious crimes to justice.102 As such, if a
case of international crime is under the investigation of a state that has
jurisdiction over the case, or the state has already investigated and tried the case,
the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction in that case.103 However, if a state fails
to fulfill its obligations and is either unwilling and/or unable to investigate a
case, the ICC is supposed to intervene and assert its jurisdiction over that case.104
This way, national courts function as the first resort and the ICC as the last
resort.105 The purpose of the principle of complementarity goes to the heart of
the ICC mandate which is making sure that all serious crimes of concern are
prosecuted and punished.106
A complementarity analysis, therefore, rests on an examination of
unwillingness and inability. To determine whether unwillingness is present, the
ICC will consider three situations. First, a state would be viewed as unwilling if
it is taking or has taken measures that aim to shield a person from criminal
96. Id.
97. The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at pmbl., ¶ 10 & art. 1.
98. Julianne Kippenberg & Pascale Kambale, The International Criminal Court: How
Nongovernmental Organizations Can Contribute to the Prosecution of War Criminals, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 2004), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/icc0904/icc
0904.pdf.
99. See The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17, § 1 (a)–(c).
100. PAUL SEILS, HANDBOOK ON COMPLEMENTARITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF
NATIONAL COURTS AND THE ICC IN PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 29 (Meredith Barges
ed., 2012).
101. See, e.g., JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 99 (2008); Ignaz Stegmiller, Complementarity Thoughts, 21 CRIM. L. F.
159, 160–61 (2010).
102. See The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17, § 1 (a)–(c).
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Hazim, supra note 5, at 628.
106. See id.
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responsibility for any serious crimes he/she might have committed.107 Second,
a state would exhibit unwillingness if it permits an unreasonable delay in the
proceedings that is not compatible with the intent of bringing a suspect of
international crimes to justice.108 Finally, a state would be considered unwilling
if the impartiality and independence of the proceedings are under question.109 In
determining the inability of a state in a particular case, the ICC will take into
account “whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its
national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its
proceedings.”110
Unlike the Afghanistan Government’s argument, and in line with the ICC’s
findings, this Article asserts that the two-prong test of unwillingness and
inability are met in Afghanistan’s situation. First, the government of
Afghanistan has not been willing to investigate and prosecute the grave crimes
allegedly perpetrated within its territory. Although the unwillingness test could
be applied in each individual case, overall there are numerous indications of a
general unwillingness on the part of the government of Afghanistan. First, an
Amnesty Law was adopted by the government of Afghanistan which grants
unlimited impunity for all past and future perpetrators of international crimes.111
This amounts to shielding the perpetrators of international crimes. Second, in
the past fourteen years, while almost all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan
have been accused of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, the
government of Afghanistan has not prosecuted a single such case.112 Finally, the
ICC consistently reported on the non-cooperation of Afghanistan with the ICC’s
requests.113 This indicates that the government of Afghanistan is in fact
unwilling to engage in prosecution of these crimes.
Moreover, Afghanistan has not been able to prosecute international crimes.
According to Transparency International reports, Afghanistan is one of the most
corrupt countries in the world.114 Afghanistan’s police, prosecution, and
judiciary have all been identified as dysfunctional.115 A dysfunctional judicial
system cannot deliver justice to the people. In addition, “politicians, government
officials, and other powerful figures” have significant influence on the judicial

107. See The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 17 (2)(a).
108. See id. at art. 17(2)(b).
109. See id. at art. 17(2)(c).
110. See id. at art. 17 (3).
111. See Hazim, supra note 5, at 625.
112. See Qaane, supra note 75.
113. Id.
114. Asia Pacific: Fighting Corruption Is Side-lined, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/asia_pacific_fighting_corruption_is_side_lined.
115. Corruption in Afghanistan: What Needs to Change, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Fed. 16,
2016), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_in_afghanistan_what_needs_to_
change.
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processes.116 Furthermore, the government of Afghanistan has been struggling
to establish appropriate institutions with good human capital and resources to
tackle international crimes. Given this situation, the government of Afghanistan
will not be able to prosecute such international crimes in the foreseeable future.
The OTP and Pre-Trial Chamber have reached the same conclusion that,
based on available information, the principle of complementarity applies in
Afghanistan’s situation. In the public redacted version of her request for
authorization of an investigation, the chief prosecutor of the ICC assessed the
admissibility of the cases before her (those categories of crimes committed by
the Taliban or Afghan forces) based on the fact that no genuine domestic
investigations have been conducted to hold those people who bear the greatest
responsibility in Afghanistan accountable.117 Apparently, the prosecutor
provided a list of all the cases that had not been prosecuted by the government
of Afghanistan to the Pre-Trial Chamber.118 In explaining why the present cases
were admissible before the court, the prosecutor relied on the absence of
national investigation or prosecution of the cases as well as the adoption of the
Amnesty Law.119 For instance, in her argument, the prosecutor claimed that “the
information available indicates that at this stage no national investigations or
prosecutions have been conducted or are ongoing against those who appear most
responsible for the crimes allegedly committed by members of the Taliban and
affiliated armed groups as set out in this Request….”120 The Pre-Trial Chamber
II accepted the Prosecutor’s assertion and considered the cases admissible. The
Chamber note that “the available information clearly indicates that the
proceedings conducted so far in Afghanistan are limited in scope and did not
target those who may bear the main responsibility for the incidents reflected in
the annexes to the Request.”121
With respect to the war crimes that were allegedly committed by U.S. forces,
the prosecutor made a cautious assessment. The prosecutor admitted that the
U.S. may challenge her complementarity assessment on the ground that those
cases had already been prosecuted and tried in U.S. courts.122 However, due to
her inability to obtain sufficient information on whether domestic proceedings
had been undertaken in the cases,123 the prosecutor concluded that the cases were
currently admissible, her assessment remaining provisional until she could
obtain concrete and valid information during the investigation.124 The Pre-Trial
Chamber confirmed the Prosecutor’s assessment and granted the admissibility

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See The OTP Request, supra note 64, at ¶¶ 269, 271, & 272.
See id. at ¶ 275.
See id.
Id. at ¶ 269.
The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 77.
See The OTP Request, supra note 64, at para. 295 & 296.
Id. at para. 296.
Id.
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of the potential cases involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan.125 Referring to the
available information, the Chamber maintained that the available information
did not indicate that the U.S. had carried out national criminal investigations or
prosecutions.126 It also stressed that “non-judicial and administrative measures
rather than criminal prosecutions do not result in inadmissibility under article
17.”127
After the Chief Prosecutor announced her request to the Pre-Trial Chamber
in 2017, the government of Afghanistan reacted to the prosecutor’s decision and
adopted a contrary stance. It appears that Afghanistan, like Kenya,128 prefers to
argue against ICC intervention and desires more time for its national
processes.129 Afghanistan contends that the principle of complementarity is not
yet applicable because Afghanistan is not unwilling or unable to investigate and
prosecute the relevant international crimes.130 At the 16th Session of Assembly
of State Parties to the Rome Statute (held at the UN headquarters from
December 4–14, 2017), the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the UN
explained to the Assembly of State Parties that Afghanistan had made
significant progress on reforming its judicial system and was willing to
prosecute the allegedly committed crimes.131 The representative of Afghanistan
to the UN purported that “various measures have been taken by our criminal
justice system in the investigation and prosecution of crimes under the Rome
Statute, including those for which the Office of the Prosecutor has requested
information.”132 However, he did not give further details about what those
measures were, and it is not clear what kinds of measures he was referring to.
Furthermore, he asked the ICC to give Afghanistan more time to investigate and
prosecute the crimes. He noted that “it is imperative to ensure ample time for a
clear, thorough and accurate observation of judicial measures taken by our
relevant institutions on related incidents.”133
On December 2, 2019, Afghanistan’s government rendered a written
submission to the Appeal Chamber of the ICC, supporting the Pre-Trial’
Chamber’s decision and arguing, in part, against applicability of the principle
of complementarity.134 There is nothing new in the submission. Afghanistan
125. The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 79.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Kenya also argued that its national processes should be given more time to work before
the ICC indicted anyone. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS,
PROCESS 532 (2015).
129. Cf. Saikal, supra note 95.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Written
Submissions of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, para. 7 & 13 (Dec. 2,
2019) [hereinafter Afghanistan’s Submission].
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basically reemphasizes on its previous argument that it is willing and able to
prosecute international crimes committed within the territory of the country.135
The government asserts that Afghanistan has taken serious steps toward
fulfilling its obligations such as institutional reforms in judiciary, building the
capacity of judges and prosecutors, incorporating international crimes in the
new Penal Code, and establishing an International Crimes Office.136
Furthermore, it vaguely refers to prosecution of nearly 1,500 cases related to
international and terrorism crimes.137 However, the government does not
provide any specific evidence to show that it has prosecuted any of the crimes
that are the subject of the ICC investigation.138 It appears that Afghanistan is
solely trying to further delay the ICC intervention in the country. For instance,
in the submission, the government of Afghanistan requests the Appeal Chamber
to either dismiss the Prosecutor’s appeal or return the case back to the Pre-Trial
Chamber for further consideration.139 The submission provides:
Finally, if the Appeals Chamber concludes that the issues now raised by
Afghanistan in relation to its national investigations and prosecutions are not to
be decided in this appeal, and that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in its approach,
Afghanistan would respectfully invite the Appeal Chamber not to authorise an
investigation itself but to remit this matter back to the Pre-Trial Chamber to
reconsider its decision with the benefit of the Appeals Chamber’s guidance on
the meaning of the “interests of justice” and to take into account all the evidence
including these submissions about national investigations.140
In a recent development, in reaction to the authorization of investigation by
the Appeals Chamber, the Afghan National Security Council held a meeting
chaired by the Afghan President on March 19, 2020.141 Once again, that meeting
concluded that Afghanistan is willing and able to prosecute the international
crimes which are under consideration of the OTP.142
The argument of the Afghan government is not convincing. One should ask
the government, is fifteen years not enough time? Furthermore, it is insufficient
to argue that Afghanistan has taken measures to prosecute the crimes in question
simply because, as previously explained, the government of Afghanistan has
recently incorporated those international crimes into the new penal code. This
argument fails as there are no indications that a single case is under investigation
135. See id. at para. 1–32.
136. See id. at para. 16–18.
137. Id. at para. 23.
138. Katherine Gallagher & Nikki Reisch, ICC Holds Historic Hearings on U.S. Torture and
Other Grave Crimes in Afghanistan, JUSTICE SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.just
security.org/67843/icc-holds-historic-hearing-on-u-s-torture-and-other-grave-crimes-in-afghanistan/.
139. Afghanistan’s Submission, supra note 134, at para. 65 & 66.
140. Id. at para. 11.
141. See ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL WAS HELD UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF MOHAMMAD ASHRAF GHANI, THE PRESIDENT
OF AFGHANISTAN (Mar. 19, 2020), https://president.gov.af/da/?p=24570.
142. See id.
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under the relevant provisions of the new code. Indeed, the ICC has already
rejected a similar argument in connection with a Kenyan case, laying out clear
reasoning that is instructive here. In the case Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang, Kenya
contended the case was under domestic investigation and thus not admissible
before the ICC.143 The Court rejected Kenya’s argument and maintained that the
“case is only inadmissible before the Court if the same suspects are being
investigated by Kenya for substantially the same conduct.”144 Further, the ICC
interpreted Article 17(1)(a), especially the words “is being investigated” as
meaning that an actual investigation should be ongoing, such as “interviewing
witnesses or suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic
analyses.”145 According to the ICC ruling, “the mere preparedness” of a state for
an investigation is insufficient to render a case inadmissible.146 Given the ICC’s
interpretation of Article 17(1) and its application to the facts presented above,
Afghanistan’s argument must yield; the complementarity principle and the
intervention of the ICC are legally justifiable. Countless atrocities have been
perpetrated in the country and each case could be considered independently by
the ICC. Even if Afghanistan were to prosecute one or even a handful of cases,
the ICC’s jurisdiction would pertain to the remaining cases.

V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER’S DECISION:
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
Almost 17 months after receiving the OTP request, on April 12, 2019, the
Pre-Trial Chamber II delivered its decision on Afghanistan. The situation in
Afghanistan was not referred to the OTP by the State of Afghanistan or the
Security Council; rather, the OTP started its preliminary examination in 2006
on its own initiative in accordance with Article 15 of the Rome Statute. Article
15 (1) allows the OTP to initiate an examination based on the information it
receives about the commission of crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the
ICC.147 If the OTP finds a reasonable ground to start a full investigation, it needs
to obtain the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber.148 Article 15 (3) proclaims that
“[i]f the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for
authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material
collected.”149 Then, in accordance with the Article, if the Pre-Trial Chamber
concludes there are reasonable grounds to open an investigation and “the case
appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the
143.
2011).
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See generally Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, para. 20 Judgment ¶ (Aug. 30,
Id. at para. 41.
Id.
Id.
The Rome Statute, supra note 8, at art. 15 (1).
Id. at art. 15(3).
Id.
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commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to subsequent
determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of
a case.”150 The Article also grants authority to the Pre-Trial Chamber to refuse
to authorize an investigation if it does not find a reasonable basis for launching
an investigation.151
In the case of Afghanistan, the Pre-Trial Chamber refused to authorize the
OTP to proceed with an investigation. The Prosecutor appealed the decision and
the Pre-Trial Chamber partially granted this appeal request on September 17,
2019. After that, as noted before, the Appeals Chamber authorized an
investigation. Despite the authorization of the investigation, it is worth it to
analyze and problematize the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, to reject the
Prosecutor’s request solely on the basis of “interests of justice,” and then briefly
discuss the Prosecutor’s reasoning on appeal.
Based on the information and materials presented by the Prosecutor, to
determine whether a reasonable basis exists to proceed with an investigation,
the Pre-Trial Chamber examine a number of issues including subject-matter and
territorial jurisdiction of the Court,152 admissibility issues such as
complementarity and gravity,153 and issues related to the interests of justice.154
With respect to jurisdiction and admissibility, the Pre-Trial Chamber rightly
determined that the Court has jurisdiction over the crimes in question and the
presented cases are potentially admissible in the Court (given the requirements
for complementarity and gravity were met).
However, the Chamber unanimously rejected the Prosecutor’s request,
solely on the basis of the interests of justice, claiming that “an investigation into
the situation in Afghanistan at this stage would not serve the interests of
justice.”155 Since it appears that this was the first time the Pre-Trial Chamber
has made a determination based on the interests of justice, it raises many
questions and concerns with respect to the statutory meaning of the concept and
reasoning of the Chamber. First and foremost, the Rome Statute does not define
the terms “interests of justice.” It seems a very abstract and subjective concept
within the text of the Statute. The OTP claims that it “represents one of the most
complex aspects of the Treaty. It is the point where many of the philosophical
and operational challenges in the pursuit of international criminal justice
coincide (albeit implicitly), but there is no clear guidance on what the content
of the idea is.”156 The Pre-Trial Chamber also admits there is no definition or

150. Id. at art. 15(4).
151. See id. at art. 15(5).
152. See The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 45–66.
153. See id. at para. 70–86.
154. See id. at para. 87–96.
155. See id. at para. 96.
156. Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, OTP 2 (Sept. 2007), https://www.legaltools.org/doc/bb02e5/pdf/.
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guidance concerning the meaning of the “interests of justice” within the relevant
statutory texts.157
To infer meaning for the concept of the interests of justice and determine
some measurable factors, the Chamber attempted to interpret the Statute by
referring to the main mandate of the ICC and the reasons why the Court exists
in the first place. The Chamber stated:
[T]he meaning of the interests of justice as a factor potentially precluding
the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion must be found in the overarching
objectives underlying the Statute: the effective prosecution of the most serious
international crimes, the fight against impunity and the prevention of mass
atrocities. All of these elements concur in suggesting that, at the very minimum,
an investigation would only be in the interests of justice if prospectively it
appears suitable to result in the effective investigation and subsequent
prosecution of cases within a reasonable time frame.158
Based on the Chamber’s interpretation above, the effectiveness of a potential
investigation, successful prosecution, and a “reasonable time frame” are the
determining factors to be considered in assessing the interests of justice. Later
in its decision, the Chamber examined whether the above factors were
applicable to Afghanistan. The Chamber noted three elements on the ground
that could help determine whether an investigation would be for the interests of
justice in Afghanistan. The elements include “the significant time elapsed
between the alleged crimes and the Request,”159 the minimal cooperation
secured by the Prosecutor throughout the preliminary examination,160 and the
unavailability of the relevant evidence and suspects for the Prosecutor.161
The Chamber concluded that the preliminary examination lasted so long
(almost 11 years) and the challenges that impeded the preliminary examination
are still present or have worsened.162 The Chamber asserted that “some of the
circumstances at the origin of the difficulties having marred the preliminary
examination, and of its length, either remain unchanged or have rather changed
for the worse; as such, they are also likely to impact any forthcoming
investigation which might be authorised.”163 According to the Court, since most
of the incidents presented in the cases date back to the early stages of the
preliminary examination, the Prosecutor has not been able to take meaningful
actions to preserve the relevant evidence and protect witnesses.164 The Chamber
continued, asserting that not a single request has been made by the Prosecutor
vis-a-vis preserving evidence over the eleven years of the preliminary
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 89.
Id.
Id. at para. 91.
Id.
Id.
See The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 92.
Id.
Id. at para. 93.
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examination.165 The Chamber, therefore, concluded that it was highly unlikely
that the relevant evidence would still be available.166
Furthermore, the Chamber asserted that the political landscape in the key
States and the instability in Afghanistan “make it extremely difficult to gauge
the prospects of securing meaningful cooperation from relevant authorities for
the future, whether in respect of investigations or of surrender of suspects.”167
The Chamber referred to the Prosecutor’s own assertation regarding the
difficulties faced in securing cooperation, the scarcity of which made the
duration of the preliminary examination unusually long.168 According to the
Chamber, “it seems reasonable to assume that these difficulties will prove even
trickier in the context of an investigation.”169
Finally, the Chamber raised the issue of the Court’s budget and limited
resources. The Chamber maintained that “pursuing an investigation would
inevitably require a significant amount of resources.”170 According to the
Chamber, the lack of additional resources would require the Prosecutor to
significantly reallocate its budget.171 The reallocation could severely impact
other investigations (in other countries) “which appear to have more realistic
prospects to lead to trials and thus effectively foster the interests of justice.”172
Ultimately, the Chamber concluded that “the current circumstances of the
situation in Afghanistan are such as to make the prospects for a successful
investigation and prosecution extremely limited.”173 In the final paragraph of its
reasoning, the Chamber concluded that “it is unlikely that pursuing an
investigation would result in meeting the objectives listed by the victims
favouring the investigation”174 and this “would result in creating frustration and
possibly hostility vis-a-vis the Court and therefore negatively impact its very
ability to pursue credibly the objectives it was created to serve.”175 To
summarize the Chamber decision, an actual investigation should not be opened
because it may not be effective and successful.
The reasoning of the Chamber is problematic and inconsistent. The
reasoning is not only unconvincing, it would appear the Chamber is trying to
evade its core responsibility. In other words, the Chamber’s position goes
against the very raison d’être of the Court. We should remember that the OTP
and the Chamber’s decisions are based on preliminary information and reports
produced by the UN and NGOs. Essentially, the Chamber has based its decision
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 95.
Id.
Id.
The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 96.
Id.
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upon assumptions tied to the reports and information in hand. Making a decision
based on assumptions about mass atrocities perpetrated in Afghanistan is
dangerous, potentially erroneous, and misleading.
In addition to the broad interpretation of “the interests of justice” which the
Prosecutor discusses in length in the appeal request, this Article highlights some
of the other problems and inconsistencies the Chamber’s reasoning entails. First,
the Chamber recalled the core mandate and objectives of the ICC to investigate
the most serious crimes, end the culture of impunity, and prevent mass atrocities.
Yet it does not take responsibility to achieve those objectives by authorizing an
investigation. The Chamber’s justifications for not authorizing the investigation
directly oppose those very objectives and corrode the essence of the ICC. The
question is whether merely adopting an observational stance while mass
atrocities are being committed in Afghanistan is the proper step towards
achieving the ICC’s objectives OR whether initiating an investigation is
mandated. Clearly, only an actual investigation will help achieve the ICC’s
goals.
Second, the Chamber indirectly blames the OTP for the unusual longevity
of the preliminary examination and non-preservation of evidence. The OTP
might indeed share some of the blame, but the Chamber should not forget that
the ICC as a whole bears the responsibility, not only the OTP. Most importantly,
the Chamber acknowledged that much time had elapsed, which could contribute
to the disappearance of evidence, yet fails to recognize the difficulty in
preserving evidence given the ICC’s reputation for time-consuming processes.
As one commentator observed, this is “the very problem an actual
investigation—with wide range of cooperation obligations it triggers for ICC
states parties—is meant to address.”176 Unfortunately, the Chamber does not
provide an alternative nor exhibit concern regarding the preservation of
evidence related to the more recent atrocities.
Third, the Chamber depicts the prospect of receiving cooperation as very
unlikely. It is true that securing cooperation is very challenging, and most states
do not usually provide the level of cooperation the Court needs. However, the
ICC is also not an ordinary court. It was established to address the most serious
crimes and it is expected to face and deal with very serious challenges over the
course of performing its job. In her appeal request, the Prosecutor presented a
similar argument. The Prosecutor acknowledged the challenges she faces to
secure cooperation, but she stressed that these “challenges are part of its
statutory responsibility.”177 The more serious and grave a crime is, the more
176. Christian De Vos, No ICC Investigation in Afghanistan: A Bad Decision with Big
Implications, INT’L JUST MONITOR (2019), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/04/no-iccinvestigation-in-afghanistan-a-bad-decision-with-big-implications/.
177. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Request for
Leave to Appeal the “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” ¶ para. 35 (June 7,
2019) [hereinafter Request for Leave].
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difficult it may be to address. Giving up before even starting an investigation on
the assumption that securing meaningful cooperation is not feasible would set a
very dangerous precedent. It would also provide incentives to other states to
resist and avoid cooperation so the ICC could not investigate potential
international crimes within their territories.
Fourth, it is well-known to international law practitioners that the ICC
occasionally suffers from lack of resources. However, the reasoning of the
Chamber suggests a danger to international rule of law—that the Court only has
the will to go after those crimes that are easily accessible and economical to
pursue. Investigating more serious crimes of larger scale is logically more
costly. No other state party might face war crimes so great in number and large
in scale as Afghanistan has over the past fifteen years. Yet the reasoning of the
Chamber suggests that it selectively investigates only the crimes with which the
Court is comfortable, not the most heinous crimes. If the ICC was created to
investigate the most serious crimes and end impunity, no place is more in need
of it than Afghanistan. As one commentator noted, “citing limited resources as
justification for declining an investigation effectively rewards states parties
(many of whom have been all too eager to see this issue go away) for
consistently underfunding the ICC.”178
Lastly, the Chamber’s assertion that a potentially ineffective investigation
would only create frustration and hostility towards the Court does not make
sense. Many victims (who know about the ICC jurisdiction) and human rights
activists are already frustrated with the lack of action and indifference
demonstrated by the Court. If the Court truly takes frustration seriously, it
should be aware that a lack of investigation would create more backlash and
frustration than a potentially ineffective investigation.
In addition to the problems noted above, the Prosecutor has also raised some
pertinent legal questions about the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision and the way
the Chamber interpreted the “interests of justice.” On June 7, 2019, the
Prosecutor appealed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision and raised three
important issues with respect to the interpretation of Article 15(4) and 53(1)(c)
concerning the interests of justice, the exercise of discretion by the Chamber,
and the scope of any investigation that might be authorized by the Chamber.179
The three issues include: (1) “[w]hether articles 15(4) and 53(1)(c) require or
even permit a Pre-Trial Chamber to make a positive determination to the effect
that investigations would be in the interests of justice”;180 (2) “[w]hether the PreTrial Chamber properly exercised its discretion in the factors it took into account
in assessing the interests of justice, and whether it properly appreciated those
factors”;181 and (3) “[w]hether article 15, or any other material provision of the
Statute, limits the scope of any investigation that the Pre-Trial Chamber may
178.
179.
180.
181.

Vos, supra note 176.
Request for Leave, supra note 177, at para. 3.
Id. at para. 15.
Id. at para. 19.
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authorise to the particular incidents identified by the Prosecutor in her
application under article 15(3), and incidents closely linked to those
incidents.”182
According to the Prosecutor’s request, all three issues bear constitutional
significance to all situations183 and impact the outcome of any trial184 and “the
fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings.”185 On September 17, 2019, the
Pre-Trial Chamber granted the Prosecutor leave to appeal the first and second
issues but rejected the third issue.186 With respect to why the third issue was
rejected, the Chamber reasoned that the issue was not an essential part of the
Chamber’s decision.187
After receiving the grant of appeal, the Prosecutor submitted an appeal brief
to the Appeals Chamber of the ICC on September 30, 2019.188 In the brief, the
Prosecutor presents two grounds upon which it requests the Appeals Chamber
to authorize an investigation itself or “otherwise remand the matter back to the
Pre-Trial Chamber with a direction for it to promptly authorise an
investigation.”189 According to the brief, the two grounds include “erred in law”
and “abuse of discretion” by the Pre-Trial Chamber.190 The Prosecutor asserts
that “the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in law by conditioning its determination under
article 15(4) on reaching a positive assessment of the interests of justice under
article 53(1)(c).”191 The Prosecutor also argues that “the Pre-Trial Chamber
abused its discretion when it assessed the interests of justice in this situation and
concluded that there are substantial reasons to believe that opening an
investigation would be contrary to these interests.”192 She extensively analyzes
the law and facts of the case and provides detailed reasonings on how the PreTrial Chamber erroneously understood and interpreted the law and abused its
discretion in assessing the interests of justice.193
In addition to the government of Afghanistan’s submission and the
Prosecutor’s brief, the Appeals Chamber received nearly 15 amici curiae from
individuals and various national and international organizations.194 The
182. Id. at para. 24.
183. Id. at para.18, 22, & 38.
184. See Request for Leave, supra note 177, at para. 36.
185. Id. at para. 31.
186. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Decision on the
Prosecutor and Victims’ Requests for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan,’ para. 38, 39, 41 (Sept. 17, 2019).
187. Id. at para. 41.
188. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17, Prosecution
Appeal Brief, para. 169 (Sept. 30, 2019).
189. Id.
190. Id. at para. 6 & 7.
191. Id. at para. 6.
192. Id. at para. 7.
193. See id. at para. 12–166.
194. Gallagher & Reisch, supra note 138.
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Chamber held an oral hearing on Afghanistan situation for three days between
December 4-6, 2019.195 After three months, on March 5, 2020, the Chamber
delivered its judgment, amended the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, and
authorized the Prosecutor to open an actual investigation into situation in
Afghanistan.196 In its ruling, the Chamber authorizes the Prosecutor to not only
investigate the crimes in question that have allegedly been perpetrated in
Afghanistan since May 1, 2003 but also to investigate “other alleged crimes that
have a nexus to the armed conflict in Afghanistan and are sufficiently linked to
the situation and were committed on the territory of other States Parties in the
period since 1 July 2002.”197

VI. THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROCEEDING WITH AN ACTUAL
INVESTIGATION
Although long overdue, the authorization of the investigation has been the
most notable and boldest decision of the ICC regarding the situation in
Afghanistan over the last two decades. Now it is the responsibility of the OTP
to ensure justice and conduct an impartial, independent and thorough
investigation into the situation in Afghanistan without being intimidated by
threats or political pressures from any side. It should be noted that an actual
investigation in Afghanistan would not necessarily be as perfect and effective
as the Pre-Trial Chamber was trying to portray in its reasoning. Everyone is
aware of the challenges and limits of the Court. The investigation will have
many impacts with respect to understanding the scale of the crimes and
identifying potential criminals, discovering and preserving the relevant
evidence, interviewing victims and witnesses, pressuring the government of
Afghanistan to take responsibility, ensuring justice after any potential peace
agreement with Taliban, and helping to achieve the Court’s main objectives.
First, an actual investigation will help the ICC understand the scale of crimes
that have taken place in the country over the years. Currently, almost all the
available information has been collected by the UN and international/national
NGOs. Those organizations may not have the skills and expertise of for a formal
investigation, nor the subpoena and other powers vested in the courts. Therefore,
while such information may be useful for conducting a preliminary examination,
it is insufficient for the actual investigation and trial. An ICC investigation will
also help determine the actual perpetrators of these crimes. Currently, most
reports only provide indications concerning the commission of crimes by
different parties to the conflict but fail to name the specific individuals who bear
the greatest responsibility.

195. Id.
196. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-138 05-03-2020 OA4,
Judgment on the Appeal against the Decision on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 79 (Mar. 5, 2020).
197. Id.
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Second, despite what the Pre-Trial Chamber asserted regarding the failure
to preserve evidence during the long preliminary examination, during an actual
investigation evidence can be properly preserved. During the preliminary
examination, the OTP would not have the tools nor power to discover and
preserve the necessary evidence. The OTP only received and analyzed reports
from UN agencies, NGOs and some communications from victims
(approximately 794)198 but nothing from witnesses. That is insufficient to
determine the depth and breadth of atrocities that have been perpetrated or are
being perpetrated across the country. In fact, most people in Afghanistan,
including victims and witnesses, have not even heard about the ICC.
Apparently, the representation of a limited number of victims was facilitated by
some NGOs and international lawyers. If victims and witnesses learned more
about the ICC’s jurisdiction and activities, and understood they would be heard
and protected, no doubt thousands would come forward to seek justice. Again,
an actual investigation will allow the OTP to establish a close connection with
victims and witnesses and take testimony that was not heard before.
Third, initiating an investigation will put more pressure on the government
of Afghanistan to do more to implement its new Penal Code and cooperate with
the ICC. In fact, one of the main reasons these serious international crimes were
incorporated into the new Penal Code was the pressure the government felt from
the ICC. One of the immediate impacts of an investigation on the government
of Afghanistan would be the decrease or cessation of torture and other war
crimes and crimes against humanity that allegedly have been committed by
Afghan forces. Furthermore, an investigation will force the government to take
more serious actions to address international crimes within its territory.
Fourth, for several year there have been ongoing peace negotiations between
the United States, Taliban, and the government of Afghanistan.199 A peace deal
was signed between the United States and Taliban on February 29, 2020.200 As
the result of the negotiations, a hundred of the most notorious terrorists and
Taliban members who are accused of atrocities have already been released from
prison.201 Many more terrorists and Taliban members are expected to be released
198. See The Chamber Decision, supra note 91, at para. 27 & 64.
199. See Vanda Felbab-Brown, What’s in Store after the US-Taliban Deal, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/04/whatsin-store-after-the-us-taliban-deal/.
200. See U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, AGREEMENT FOR BRINGING PEACE TO AFGHANISTAN
BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF AFGHANISTAN WHICH IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE UNITED
STATES AS A STATE AND IS KNOWN AS THE TALIBAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Feb.
29, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peaceto-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.
201. See Sharif Hassan & Susannah George, Afghan Government Releases 100 Taliban
Prisoners after Collapse of Prisoner Swap Talks, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan-government-releases-100-talibanprisoners-after-collapse-of-prisoner-swap-talks/2020/04/08/bfba7794-7982-11ea-a311-adb1344
719a9_story.html.
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without being held accountable for their heinous actions.202 After a potential
peace agreement between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, the
role of ICC engagement in the post-peace period is becoming increasingly
crucial. The Taliban have consistently and atrociously targeted civilians. They
are one of the main causes of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. As such, in the
period relevant to the ICC, the Taliban bear the greatest responsibility for the
commission of international crimes in the country. After any potential peace
agreement, there is little hope that Taliban leaders would be prosecuted by the
government of Afghanistan for their past atrocities; indeed, they might become
part of the government. In such a situation, as a neutral court, the ICC bears the
responsibility to intervene and hold Taliban leaders accountable. The ICC would
be the only hope for the victims as well. Again, an actual investigation will
prepare the ICC properly for the post-peace era, if such investigation enables
them to gather sufficient evidence and documents to effectively prosecute and
try the perpetrators.
Finally, an actual investigation will be an important step for the ICC to carry
out its mandate and achieve its objectives. Given the current situation with
respect to the release of the terrorists, the authorization of an investigation
cannot be timelier. A full investigation will retain the credibility of the ICC and
provide a window of hope and restitution for victims and innocent people who
have suffered from heinous crimes for far too long.

CONCLUSION
Despite a long history of war and the committing of mass atrocities in
Afghanistan, the Afghan government, the ICC, and the international community
as a whole have not made any significant progress to address these most heinous
crimes nor to hold the perpetrators accountable. The ICC’s extremely slow and
insufficient actions and lack of accountability perpetuate a culture of impunity
and result in the people of Afghanistan continuing to suffer from the
reoccurrence of such grave crimes. The accession of Afghanistan to the Rome
Statute has not yet had any tangible positive effects in the country. On the one
hand, the government of Afghanistan has not fully complied with the
expectations of the Rome Statute to investigate and prosecute the relevant
crimes in the country. On the other hand, the ICC itself has failed to duly carry
out its mandate. The ICC’s objectives to prosecute the three categories of
crimes, end the culture of impunity, and create a deterrent effect have not yet
materialized. While the authorization of an investigation by the Appeals
Chamber is unquestionably a positive step forward, the OTP has a long, rocky,
and uneasy path for carrying out its activities and conducting an effective
investigation and prosecution. Despite such challenges, nothing should wither
the determination of the OTP and the entire institution of the ICC to take the
necessary steps toward securing justice and accomplishing its mandate. The
202. See id.
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future success of the ICC largely depends on conducting a thorough
investigation and addressing these serious crimes in Afghanistan. The ICC’s
actions are under scrutiny by the people of Afghanistan and the rest of the world;
the ICC must duly carry out its mandate and deliver justice to the innocent
victims of these heinous crimes in Afghanistan.
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